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Debates around the design and content of climate change adaptation policies are shaped, in part, by the power and inﬂuence of
actors within an adaptation regime. This paper applies a power-mapping technique, Multilevel Stakeholder Inﬂuence
Mapping (MSIM), to stakeholders in Ghana’s agricultural adaptation policy regime. The method provides a quantitative
inﬂuence score and visual map for actor groups active-in or affected-by the policy process, from the differentiated
perspectives of national, regional, and local-level respondents. MSIM, as applied here, seeks to determine the underlying
power structure of the adaptation regime and provides insight in to two key power-laden themes: stakeholder participation
and multilevel institutional design. Results indicate that when taken collectively (the views of national, regional and local
respondents combined) Ghana’s adaptation regime is considered bipolar and elite-centred in its power distribution. A
distinguishable ‘adaptation establishment’ or dominant group of power holders made up of technical government and
international agencies can be identiﬁed. Meanwhile, political groups, the private sector, civil society, and universities are
considered to wield substantially less power in the regime. Differentiated perspectives (i.e. national, regional or local
respondents alone) reveal that several potential cross-level bridging institutions are not considered inﬂuential at all
operational levels. Farmers, traditional authorities, and the District Assembly, for example, are all considered highly
inﬂuential from the perspective of local-level respondents, but their counterpart agencies at the national level are not
considered inﬂuential by policymakers there. Contrary to the hyper-politicized nature of climate change adaptation at
international levels, Ghana’s policy regime would beneﬁt from increased participation from political agents, as well as
from traditional authorities and farmers. These actor groups can help reverse the a-political nature of the adaptation
regime, improve power pluralism across actor groups and levels, and facilitate cross-level cooperation between formal and
informal institutions crucial to adaptation success.
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1. Introduction
Agriculture is a mainstay of the Ghanaian economy contri-
buting to nearly 25% of the country’s gross domestic
product (Government of Ghana, 2014b). Relying heavily
on rain-fed systems with limited irrigation infrastructure,
the sector is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change. In the northern regions, where the bulk
of Ghana’s cereal crops are produced, already harsh
median temperatures are expected to further increase by
the year 2030 (Jalloh, Nelson, Thomas, Zougmore, &
Roy-Macauley, 2013). The Government of Ghana has
taken policy steps to mitigate the negative effects of
climate change across a variety of sectors, including agri-
culture. This includes the development of a National
Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) in 2012,
and a National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) in 2014.
Climate change has also been addressed in the country’s
Medium-term National Development Policy Framework
and the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy
II. Despite such progress, Ghana remains in the early
stages of adaptation regime formation.
The development of the above-mentioned policies
necessarily involves participation from diverse stakeholder
groups, each with their own interests and objectives. What
is included or excluded from adaptation policy is widely
discussed and very often contested. Agricultural adaptation
in Ghana draws on an especially wide network of stake-
holders (and interests) given the diverse agro-ecological
zones and the correspondingly context-speciﬁc adaptation
requirements across the country. Power relations between
actors determine how adaptation is deﬁned, who or what
is considered ‘vulnerable’, and what adaptive measures
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
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are ultimately prioritized. Indeed, how the debates around
policy design and content are resolved is dependent upon
a variety of factors including stakeholders’ access to (and
quality of) decision-making forums (Few, Brown, & Tomp-
kins, 2007; Sherman & Ford, 2014), legitimation of certain
forms of knowledge over others (Adler & Bernstein, 2005;
Jennings, 2009; Nyong, Adesina, & Elasha, 2007), prevail-
ing norms and values (Adger et al., 2009), institutional
design (Agrawal, 2008; Dovers & Hezri, 2010), and per-
ceptions of climate impacts and vulnerability, among
other considerations. These factors, in turn, are shaped by
the interests and power of actor groups within the adap-
tation regime (Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005a; Sova
et al., 2015).
The Earth Systems Governance (ESG) project research
framework promotes the debate around power in socio-eco-
logical systems research. ESG recognizes power as a key
cross-cutting theme that affects ﬁve central analytical pro-
blems (architecture, agency, adaptiveness, accountability
and legitimacy, and allocation and access) facing the gov-
ernance of socio-ecological systems (Biermann et al.,
2010). The authors note the ubiquitous nature of power
and the challenges in its conceptualization. They suggest
that despite its centrality, ‘how power is conceived in
studies of governance and institutions is not often dis-
cussed’ (Biermann et al., 2010, p. 289). Adaptation govern-
ance offers no exception.
Yet addressing power in any complex system is impor-
tant for practical reasoning (i.e. navigating a world of
agents and their powers), for the moral allocation of respon-
sibility, and for the evaluation of social systems (Morriss,
2002). This is especially important in early regime for-
mation – as is the case with climate change adaptation in
Ghana – in that a clear baseline analysis of power can
assist in developing appropriate success measures for pro-
cedural and/or distributional justice that contribute to the
improved adaptive capacity of vulnerable populations.
Understanding which actor groups are inﬂuential or power-
ful within a given adaptation regime is thus of considerable
consequence, and can lead to improved policy and insti-
tutional design (Sherman & Ford, 2014).
This study applies a recently developed methodology,
Multilevel Stakeholder Inﬂuence Mapping (MSIM) (Sova
et al., 2014), to visually map the level of inﬂuence of
actors within Ghana’s agricultural climate change adap-
tation policy regime, using a district in the Upper West
Region as a case study. The study constitutes among the
ﬁrst efforts to empirically map power and inﬂuence in adap-
tation regimes. It asks the questions ‘which actor groups
currently possess the greatest inﬂuence across various
“operational” levels (i.e. national, regional, and local)
with respect to the design and implementation of agricul-
tural climate change policy?’, and ‘what can be said
about the resulting power structure (i.e. is the resulting
regime elite-centred or pluralistic in nature)?’ This paper
does not seek to provide a comprehensive review of the
treatment of power within the social sciences (for such ana-
lyses, see Lukes, 1974, 2005; Morriss, 2002, among
others). Nor does it seek to identify and typify common
sources or ‘bases’ of power (see French & Raven, 1959;
Greene & Elfrers 1999, among others). Rather, the main
purpose of the study is to map the power and inﬂuence of
actor groups in relation to adaptation policy formation
and implementation. As such, the results of this analysis
are likely to be of immediate interest to academics and
practitioners working in the area of stakeholder partici-
pation and multilevel system design around climate
adaptation.
What follows in Section 2 is a review of common
power orientations in governance literature and an assess-
ment of the current treatment of power within two key
climate change adaptation themes: stakeholder engagement
and multilevel institutional design. The MSIM method-
ology is then introduced in Section 3, followed by an intro-
duction of the Ghana case study context in Section
4. Section 5 provides objective MSIM results, while
Section 6 discusses the implications of MSIM results as
they relate to existing governance and adaptation literature
in West Africa. The limitations of the study are outlined in
Section 7, and concluding remarks are given in Section 8.
2. Power in adaptation literature
Power dynamics between actors inﬂuences regime for-
mation. Power is deﬁned here in the Weberian sense as
the ability to inﬂuence the behaviour of others, with or
without resistance (Weber, 1978). ‘Power’ and ‘inﬂuence’
are used interchangeably in this study. Regime formation
implicitly assigns roles to participants, determining who
decides what is considered ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’,
and dictating the legitimacy of the resulting structure (i.e.
the classic question ‘who governs?’). ‘At the most
general level governance is a social function centred on
efforts to steer or guide the actions of human groups…
towards the achievement of desired ends and away from
outcomes regarded as undesirable’ (Young, 2013, p. 3).
Who governs matters in adaptation planning because how
we choose to draw the boundaries around scope, scale,
and time frame of adaptation, which disturbances elicit
the need to adapt, and what are the notions of desirability
or improvement of the governance system often completely
determines the conclusions and recommendations for
action (Helfgott, 2011).
Regime power structures often fall on a spectrum
between ‘elite-centred’ and ‘pluralistic’ orientations
(Dahl, 1958; Liu, Lindquist, Vedlitz, & Vincent, 2010;
Merelman, 1968; Mills, 1956; Vergara, 2013; Wong,
2010). Pluralist theory presumes that power is dispersed
among several groups that compete equally for resources.
Meanwhile, elite theory posits that power is concentrated
2 C. A. Sova et al.
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in the hands of a few individuals or organizations that exert
disproportionate inﬂuence over decision-making. ‘Elites
may be deﬁned as persons who, by virtue of their strategic
locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and
movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly
and substantially’ (Higley, 2008, p. 3). Elite-centred
regimes often lack transparency, devalue representation of
non-elites (or ‘non-experts’), and – particularly important
for multilevel systems – undermine the principle of subsi-
diarity (i.e. that affairs should be handled by the lowest,
least centralized competent administrative or political
unit). Meanwhile, regimes that are truly pluralistic are
driven by public opinion, and tend to be more egalitarian
and participatory in nature, and thus exhibit greater trans-
parency, responsiveness, and legitimacy in the eyes of
‘constituents’.
Whether an adaptation regime is elite-centred or plura-
listic (or somewhere in between) is determined in part by
two central power-laden factors commonly discussed by
adaptation theorists: institutional design (especially the
multilevel nature of adaptation governance structures),
and participation in adaptation decision-making.
2.1. Institutional design
Institution-focused studies of adaptation aim to discover
appropriate institutional designs, rules, and decision-making
procedures to improve the efﬁciency and equitability in the
delivery of adaptation resources to vulnerable communities
(Agrawal, 2010; Berman, Quinn, & Paavola, 2012; Christo-
plos et al., 2009; Eakin & Lemos, 2010; Gupta et al., 2010;
Næss, Bang, Eriksen, & Vevatne, 2005; Schipper, Fencl,
Hoffmaister, & Osbeck, 2012). Studies of this sort draw
attention to key power-laden concepts like decentralization
and devolution of authority in adaptation regimes, and adap-
tive/collaborative management arrangements (Berkes, 2010;
Brockhaus & Kambire, 2009; Tompkins & Adger, 2004).
Institutional scholars emphasize the importance of multilevel,
multiscale characteristics of climate change adaptation
(Adger, 2001; Adger et al., 2005a, 2005b; MacKinnon,
2011; Ostrom, 2010a; Ribot, 2010; Urwin & Jordan, 2008;
Vincent, 2007). Vertical interplay in particular between multi-
level, ‘polycentric’ (Ostrom, 2010b) institutions in adaptation
regimes are constrained by relationships of power (Tompkins
& Adger, 2004; Young, 2013, 2002). Yates (2012) for
example, adopts MacKinnon’s (2011) ‘scalar politics’ con-
struct to analyse cross-level power dynamics in Nepal’s adap-
tation regime. MacKinnon suggests that there is an
important distinction to be made between ‘politics of
scale’, or the idea that politics occur on a given, ﬁxed
level with deﬁned boundaries and ‘scalar politics’. Scalar
politics refers to the ‘strategic deployment of scale’ or
the purposeful utilization of multilevel structures to
promote one’s interests. Viewed in this way, power is
seen not as a product of multilevel structures and their
hierarchies, but that those structures serve as an instrumen-
tal medium through which to channel power.
2.2. Participation
Another prevalent theme for the study of power in adap-
tation regimes is stakeholder participation. Few et al.
(2007) discuss the micro-politics of stakeholder consul-
tation and participation in adaptation regimes and the use
of ‘managerial containment’ by powerful actors to guide
participatory engagements towards predetermined goals.
This work is reﬂective of a wider trend in critical stake-
holder engagement literature that seeks to demonstrate
how participatory processes can serve as in instrument of
power and domination (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Rydin &
Pennington, 2000; Sherman & Ford, 2014; Treby &
Clark, 2004). These authors argue that ‘empowerment’ –
the common usage of power in this domain – through
improved participation in decision-making can improve
equitability and can reduce stakeholder vulnerability, but
the creation of a space of engagement alone does not
equal success in this regard (Skouﬁas, 2003; Thomas &
Twyman, 2005; Tompkins & Adger, 2004). Improved
adaptive capacity, rather, relies on active participation by
concerned parties (Smit & Pilifosova, 2001).
Ultimately, understanding who is perceived to be
powerful or inﬂuential in adaptation regimes is an impor-
tant ﬁrst step in paving the way for more robust analyses
of the sources of power addressed above. As suggested
by Few et al., ‘any participatory process will only gain
legitimacy if the relevant stakeholders are included and if
effort is invested in ﬁnding out who is “important” in
policy, meaning both who is most inﬂuential and also
who is most likely to be affected by decisions and
actions’ (Few et al., 2007, p. 56). Achieving this through
MSIM analysis, as we will see, can provide important
insight in to participatory arrangements and multilevel
institutional design.
3. MSIM in Ghana
MSIM is a simple visual tool to examine and display the
relative inﬂuence that different individuals and groups
have over decision-making (Mayers & Vermeulen, 2005).
The original methodology, Stakeholder Inﬂuence
Mapping, was developed by James Mayers and Sonja Ver-
meulen (2005) at the International Institute for Environ-
ment and Development and was adapted by Sova et al.
(2014) to serve in multilevel analyses.
MSIM uses circles to represent different stakeholder
groups, placed by an individual respondent within a
pyramid where the policy/legislation (or broad scenario)
in question serves as the pyramid cap or ‘apex’. The per-
ceived inﬂuence of each actor group is shown in the relative
closeness of the circles to the policy apex. Different colour
Climate and Development 3
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and size circles can be used to represent stakeholder groups
during the mapping activity (e.g. government, non-govern-
mental organization (NGOs), civil society, etc.). The
average location of a group relative to other stakeholders
on each individual MSIM map is used to produce a compo-
site inﬂuence score for each stakeholder group. A compo-
site map that visualizes power from the combined
perspective of the entire sample – or from other meaningful
subsets of respondents – can also be produced. As
suggested by Sova et al. (2014),
MSIM builds on existing power-elucidating techniques in
that its individual interview style mitigates against group
polarization (and group think), its use of an elicitation
object more easily facilitates the sharing of sensitive infor-
mation, it allows power perspectives across multiple actor
levels, and it serves as a useful technique in delineating
system boundaries as perceived by different actor groups.
(p. 384)
MSIM utilizes perception-based data and relies on triangu-
lation between actor groups to determine an inﬂuence
score. Perceptions, while imperfect, are particularly impor-
tant in early regime formation where power structures have
yet to be full institutionalized. It is, after all, ‘the world as it
is perceived is the world that is behaviourally important’
(Jain, 2005, p. 47). Perception is at the heart of bias for-
mation. Bias formation in adaptation regimes, in turn,
determines which adaption pathways are considered more
or less viable.
MSIM differs from Social Network Analysis and inter-
organizational network analysis in that ‘MSIM does not
speak to the strength or type of connection between the
actors discussed… it seeks only to elucidate an actor
group’s relationship towards a policy process or decision-
making scenario, and only by extension, its relationship
to other actors’ (Sova et al., 2014, p. 385). A generic
example map is found in Figure 1 below.
The MSIM methodology contains 13 steps, outlined in
detail in Sova et al. (2014), and summarized in Table 1
below. Here the MSIM steps have been grouped according
to three stages of implementation: preparation, mapping,
and analysis. The ‘mapping’ stage is conducted with the
respondents, while ‘preparation’ and ‘analysis’ are con-
ducted separately by the analyst.
3.1. Preparation
The MSIM exercise in Ghana focused on the policy apex
‘the design and implementation of agricultural climate
change adaptation policy’ (step 1), and focused on the
current state of power dynamics as of 2013 (step 2).
MSIM mapping was conducted with 30 separate respon-
dents using rational subgrouping sampling and represent-
ing a cross-section of actors within Ghana’s agricultural
adaptation regime including government actors, civil
society, donors, and farmers. These actors were chosen
from a larger sample of 100 respondents participating in
semi-structured interviews for a broader PhD study. Com-
prising principally of senior professionals within their
organization, this subset was chosen for the respondents’
intimate knowledge of climate change and agricultural
policy at their particular operational level, and to ensure
appropriate representation from diverse actor group types.
Given the slow progress in decentralizing adaptation plan-
ning in Ghana, a limited number of knowledgeable individ-
uals were identiﬁed at regional and local operational levels.
As outlined in Table 2 below, a total of 15 respondents were
chosen from the national level, 7 from the regional level,
and 8 from the local level (step 3). Regional and district
locations were selected on the basis of agricultural
climate change vulnerability (temperature, rainfall, and
pest and disease risk) as identiﬁed through Ghana’s
UNFCCC 2nd communication (see Section ‘4’ below).
Before MSIM mapping was conducted, the authors
assembled a comprehensive list of 73 policy stakeholders
with support from a key informant from the University of
Ghana, Legon (step 4). This list included actor groups
related to agriculture and climate change in any capacity
in Ghana. The stakeholders on the comprehensive list
were grouped in to the following categories: ‘national gov-
ernment’, ‘regional/local government’, ‘civil society’,
‘NGOs/INGOs’, ‘bilateral and multilateral donors’, and
‘private sector’. The list included speciﬁc organizations
and agencies where possible (e.g. Ministry of Food and
Agriculture (MoFA), the World Bank, and University of
Ghana), and generic stakeholder groups when necessary
(e.g. traditional authorities, women’s groups, and input pro-
viders). The order of the stakeholders under each category
was randomized so as to reduce the potential bias of
the analysts in ordering the actor groups. The ﬁnal compre-
hensive stakeholder list and a blank MSIM mapping board
(A4 size) were printed and brought to each interview
(step 5).
3.2. Mapping
MSIM mapping interviews were conducted with respon-
dents in May of 2013. At each interview, the respondent
was ﬁrst presented with the comprehensive stakeholder
list. They were asked to place a checkmark (‘tic’) next to
the 20 actor groups that they felt to be most ‘highly rel-
evant’ to the policy focus in question (i.e. those actor
groups active-in or affected-by agricultural adaptation
policy). The respondent was free to add new relevant
actors to the list (step 6). The rationale for an initial prior-
itization of actors/actor groups was to bring the stakeholder
list down to a more manageable size for mapping. Note was
taken of the relative size of each stakeholder group ident-
iﬁed in this step to be used later in the digitization of the
maps (step 7).
4 C. A. Sova et al.
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The respondent then placed each of the actors groups
deemed ‘highly relevant’ one-by-one on the inﬂuence
mapping board, drawing, in the form of a circle, the most
powerful/inﬂuential actor group at the top, or apex of the
pyramid, and the least (less) inﬂuential at the bottom
(step 9). Power was deﬁned to the respondent as ‘the
ability to inﬂuence the behaviour of others, with or
without resistance’ (step 8).
As each actor was placed on the map, the respondent
was asked what type of power/inﬂuence the actor/actor
group was exercising (i.e. position, personality, persuasion,
coercion, force, knowledge, and resource), and was
prompted to indicate whether that inﬂuence resulted from
any policy or legal framework (step 10). As this study
focused on current state of power dynamics, questions as
proposed in step 11 of Sova et al. (2014), ‘assessing
system boundaries’, were not asked to respondents. Asses-
sing system boundaries is intended to reveal the way the
system ‘ought to be’ by focusing on sources of control,
motivation, knowledge, and legitimacy. It is a normative
form of assessment not applicable here given that this
study limited its scope to how the system ‘is’ at present.
3.3. Analysis
Following the interviews, each of the 30 MSIM maps was
digitized to facilitate the production of an inﬂuence score
for the 73 stakeholder groups on the comprehensive list.
Determining an inﬂuence score from multiple, individual
maps involved two principle variables: (1) the frequency,
or the number of respondents that found the stakeholder
group ‘highly relevant’ to the policy focus in question
(step 6); and (2) the adjusted ranking, or the average
ranking level at which the stakeholder was placed on the
map by respondents (the higher the ranking level, the
higher the perceived inﬂuence) (step 9).
Figure 1. Example MSIM map.
Note: This is a generic stakeholder inﬂuence mapping/MSIM mapping board intended as an example, not as a paper result. The policy
object, or apex, is located at the top of the mapping pyramid. Actor groups in the form of circles placed closest to this ‘apex’ are
deemed most inﬂuential from the perspective of the respondent. Actors near the bottom of the pyramid are deemed less inﬂuential, but
not without inﬂuence entirely. Different actor types are indicated by colour (or shade), including civil society, government, international,
and private sector. The size of the circle approximates the relative population of that actor group, though this has no bearing on the ﬁnal
inﬂuence score.
Climate and Development 5
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As suggested by Sova et al. (2014), a relative ranking score
(R) was ﬁrst established by the analyst by counting each
actor groups upwards from the bottom of each inﬂuence
map and assigning the counted value as the ranking
score. That is, the actor placed lowest on an inﬂuence
map receives a ranking score of 1, the second lowest a
score of 2, the third lowest a score of 3, and so on.
Actors/actor groups placed on the same level as one
another receive the same ranking score (e.g. ‘farmers’
and ‘rural poor’ placed side by side at the bottom of an
inﬂuence pyramid would both receive a ranking score
of 1). Ranking scores for each actor group were recorded
in a spreadsheet.
It should be noted that this counting strategy allows for
a different number of ranking levels to be identiﬁed by each
respondent. To ensure that the highest and lowest ranked
Table 1. MSIM 13-step methodology.
Stage MSIM step
Preparation 1. Deﬁne policy focus
2. Deﬁne one or more key time periods
3. Identify inﬂuence-mapping respondents
4. Identify policy stakeholders
5. Prepare materials
Mapping (with respondents) 6. Fine-tune the stakeholder list
7. Estimate stakeholder group sizes
8. Deﬁne ‘inﬂuence’ and its relation to ‘power’ as it is understood
within your conceptual framework
9. Map stakeholder inﬂuence and relationships
10. Identify key moments and mechanisms
11. Assess system boundaries
Analysis 12. Keep record of map for future reference
13. Calculate inﬂuence score
Source: Adapted from Sova et al. (2014).
Table 2. MSIM respondents by actor level.
Respondent organization Organization type
Level of
operation
National Patriotic Party (NPP) Civil society (political
group)
National (Accra)
GEF Multilateral donor National (Accra)
MoFA (×2) Government National (Accra)
Ghana Environmental Conventions Coordinating Agency (GECCA) Government National (Accra)
Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) Academia National (Accra)
NDPC Government National (Accra)
University of Ghana, East Legon (×2) Academia National (Accra)
CSIR, Science and Technology Policy Research Institute (STEPRI) Academia National (Accra)
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) Private sector National (Accra)
Ghana Climate Action Network (G-CAN) Civil society National (Accra)
CSIR, Animal Research Institute (ARI) Academia National (Accra)
Climate Action Network (CAN) INGO National (Accra)
Development Institute NGO National (Accra)
MoFA Government Region (Wa)
Ghana Social Opportunities Project (GSOP) NGO Region (Wa)
EPA Government Region (Wa)
RCC Government Region (Wa)
Council of Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research (Savannah Agricultural Research Institute
(SARI))
Academia Region (Wa)
Plan Ghana INGO Region (Wa)
Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) Government/private sector Region (Wa)
Farmer (×2) Private sector Local (Lawra)
District Agricultural Development Ofﬁce Government Local (Lawra)
Local agricultural development NGO NGO Local (Lawra)
DA (×2) Government Local (Lawra)
Village chief Traditional Authority Local (Lawra)
Religious body Civil Society Local (Lawra)
6 C. A. Sova et al.
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actor groups on each map received the same score, the rela-
tive ranking was adjusted to a normalized value. As such,
the number of ranked levels was identiﬁed for the entire
sample (n = 30) yielding an average of 13 ranked actor
levels. The relative ranking for each stakeholder on each
respondent map was then adjusted to this 13-level equival-
ent by applying a normalization formula. After applying
this function, the highest possible ranking score for an
actor group was 13 and lowest 1 across all inﬂuence
maps. For a detailed description of ‘relative’ versus
‘adjusted’ rankings, see Sova et al. (2014).
Adjusted ranking = Ranking score
13
( )
× number of ranking levels for respondent ′n′
Once normalized, the adjusted rankings for each actor
group were summed and then divided by the maximum fre-
quency score of 30 (i.e. supposing the actor was identiﬁed
as ‘highly relevant’ by all respondents in the sample) to
produce the composite inﬂuence score. This method of cal-
culation reduces biased mapping outcomes by including in
the calculation the instances that an actor/actor group was
not identiﬁed as relevant (i.e. has a mean adjusted
ranking of zero) (Sova et al., 2014).
Composite influence score
=
∑
adjusted ranking for
n1− n30
30
4. Context
The MSIM methodology was applied with stakeholders in
Ghana’s agricultural climate change adaptation regime
from national, regional, and local operational levels. This
paper adopts a deﬁnition of ‘levels’ from Cash et al.
(2006) and Gibson, Ostrom, and Ahn (2000) as the units
of analysis that are located at different positions on a
scale. Accra, the nation’s capital, serves as the site for
national-level analysis, Wa, the municipal capital of
Ghana’s Upper West Region (UWR) the site of regional-
level analysis, and Lawra District, UWR, the site of
local-level analysis. Detailed respondent information is
included in Table 2 above.
Nationally, it is estimated that over 50% of the working
population in Ghana is engaged directly in agriculture
(Government of Ghana, 2007). The bulk of agricultural
production remains concentrated in the hands of small-
holder farmers, with approximately 2.75 million house-
holds engaged in the sector and 90% of landholdings less
than 2 hectares in size (Government of Ghana, 2010b).
The MoFA, Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology
and Innovation (MESTI), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) (MESTI’s implementing
agency) are the three principle government bodies
charged with promoting adaptation to climate change for
the agricultural sector nationally. The National Develop-
ment Planning Commission (NDPC) and Ministry of
Finance (MoF), meanwhile, work with these agencies to
integrate climate change in to national development
plans. These government agencies are supported in this
endeavour by a host of NGOs, bilateral and multilateral
donors, and other civil society actors.
The national legislative and policy environment is
dense, with agricultural climate change objectives intro-
duced across a number of documents. This includes but is
not limited to the National Climate Change Adaptation
Strategy (Government of Ghana, 2012b), the National
Climate Change Policy (Government of Ghana, 2014a),
the Medium-term national development policy framework:
Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (Govern-
ment of Ghana, 2010c, 2014b), the Food and Agricultural
Sector Development Policy II (Government of Ghana,
2007), and the Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Invest-
ment Plan (Government of Ghana, 2010b). Ghana is cur-
rently undertaking a process of political, ﬁscal, and
administrative decentralization (Government of Ghana,
2010a), led by the Ministry of Local Government and
Rural Development (MLGRD), which is placing more
budgetary and planning responsibility on local administra-
tive and technical units (Amankwah et al., 2014; Lentz,
2006).
Regionally, the Upper West Region of Ghana is located
some 12-hour journey by bus from Accra and is sparsely
populated with less than 2.8% of the country’s population
(Government of Ghana, 2012a) of which 70.7% are con-
sidered ‘poor’, and 45.1% ‘extremely poor’ – the highest
incidences of poverty in Ghana’s 10 regions (Government
of Ghana, 2014c). Given the high levels of poverty and
deteriorating environmental conditions, the UWR is con-
sidered among Ghana’s most vulnerable regions to
climate change (Government of Ghana, 2011). The coun-
try’s second UNFCCC national communication estimates
temperature increases in Ghana’s northern savannah
regions between 1.7°C and 2.04°C by the year 2030,
with high temperatures peaking at 41°C (Government of
Ghana, 2011). This, according to crop simulation models
by MacCarthy, Adiku, and Yangyuoru (2013), will precipi-
tate declining maize yields between 19% and 41% in the
Guinea Savannah zone by 2050. Rainfall is expected to
fall 1.1% to 3.1% across all regions in Ghana by 2020,
and 13% to 21% by 2080. (Government of Ghana, 2011).
Impacts are already being felt, resulting in signiﬁcant
migration from Ghana’s northern regions (Rademacher-
Schulz, Schraven, & Mahama, 2013). Wa is the regional
capital of UWR and houses the Regional Coordinating
Council (RCC), which serves as the political and adminis-
trative centre of the UWR and undertakes development
Climate and Development 7
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planning and monitoring and evaluation. MoFA and EPA
are responsible for promoting agricultural climate change
adaptation at this operational level. Several NGOs and
civil society groups operate out of Wa, although signiﬁ-
cantly fewer in number than those operating out of
Tamale, the Northern Regional capital to the East.
Locally, the Lawra District is located in the upper-most
reaches of UWR along the border of Burkina Faso and is
home to an estimated 100,000 people, the majority of
which, 83%, are engaged in subsistence agriculture as the
base activity for their livelihood. Agriculture accounts for
80% of the district’s entire economic activity (Government
of Ghana, 2013). The district lies in the Guinea Savannah
zone of Western Africa, and as such, has one wet season
from April to October. Climate Change is reported to be
impacting on the arrival of the Tropical Maritime air
mass that brings about the rainy season (Government of
Ghana, 2011). The District Assembly (DA) serves as
Lawra District’s political and administrative centre. Decen-
tralized agencies like the District Department of Agricul-
ture, responsible for agricultural adaptation in the district,
operate under the jurisdiction of the DA. The EPA also
has an assigned desk ofﬁcer in the DA. Simultaneously, a
traditional ruling structure exists alongside these modern
political administrative units in the district, and includes a
network of village chiefs, sub-chiefs, and a Paramount
chief for the ruling area.
5. Results
This section provides the results of the MSIM analysis in
Ghana’s agricultural adaptation regime. Actors with the
highest composite inﬂuence scores for the entire sample
are discussed, followed by the actors with the lowest inﬂu-
ence scores. The highest composite inﬂuence scores are
then presented for actors groups from the perspective of
national, regional, and local respondents separately,
demonstrating how perceived inﬂuence of actor groups
changes across operational levels.
5.1. Highly inﬂuential actor groups
Table 3 contains the list of the 20 actor groups with the
highest composite inﬂuence scores (frequency combined
with the average ranking position on the MSIM maps)
from the perceptions of the entire 30 respondent sample.
The MoFA is deemed most inﬂuential with regards to
agricultural climate change adaptation policy development
and implementation in Ghana. MSIM respondents cite the
agency’s mandate for agricultural development and its
extensive network of Regional and District ofﬁces as the
key factors in MoFA’s inﬂuence in this regard. The minis-
try’s perceived expertise is also a source of power,
especially among area extension agents who are tasked
with supporting local farmers with technical innovation.
The MESTI and its implementing agency, the EPA, are
deemed nearly as inﬂuential as MoFA, given MESTI’s
mandate in steering national climate change initiatives in
Ghana, as well as both agencies’ connections to inter-
national agencies for the mobilization of climate change
resources. Farmers are also considered highly inﬂuential
in Ghana’s adaptation regime, although this inﬂuence is
mainly derived from respondents at the regional and local
levels ranking farmers as highly inﬂuential (as seen in
Table 4 below). Farmers are described as the ‘front lines’
of adaptation policy and ‘the implementers’ without
which there is no action. Farmers are also inﬂuential
because of their possession of local and traditional knowl-
edge, a valuable resource to development agencies, driven
by a growing preference among practitioners for commu-
nity based adaptation approaches. Below farmers we see
a host of government agents including the District Assem-
blies, Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research
(CSIR), Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMET), Ministry
of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR), and the Forestry
Commission (FC), all ranked for their domestic authority
and mandates on climate change related issues. Still
highly inﬂuential, but less so than those aforementioned
government agencies, is group of International organiz-
ations including UN Agencies, Global Environment Facil-
ity (GEF), and the CGIAR research program on Climate
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), among
others. The World Bank ranks considerably higher in
Table 3 than other multilateral and bilateral groups. These
international agencies are frequently cited as having
access to signiﬁcant ﬁnancial resources, well-trained staff,
and maintain autonomy in their programming from the
central government. Placed within the international
agencies are the NDPC and the MoF. NDPC and MoF are
deemed inﬂuential by respondents because of their central
role in development planning and budget allocation in
Ghana. They exhibit substantial reward power through the
plan and budget approval process. Finally, traditional auth-
orities (Chiefs and Paramount Chiefs, for example) are the
last to be included in Table 3. This highly inﬂuential group
is cited for their custodianship of lands, and their ability to
enact traditional decrees (against bush-burning for
example). Figure 2 visualizes these 20 inﬂuential actors
groups in a MSIM composite map.
5.2. Less inﬂuential actor groups
Equally informative are those actors deemed ‘less inﬂuen-
tial’ with regard to agricultural climate change adaptation
policy in Ghana by MSIM respondents. Table 4 contains
a list of actors deemed ‘highly relevant’ by at least 10
respondents (33% of respondents) but with the lowest com-
posite inﬂuence scores when using data from the complete
sample, n = 30. The ‘33% of respondents’ qualiﬁer is
designed to eliminate from the analysis the actor groups
8 C. A. Sova et al.
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never identiﬁed as ‘highly relevant’ by respondents (i.e. a
frequency and average adjusted ranking of 0), or only
identiﬁed by a handful of respondents. As suggested by
Sova et al. (2014), less inﬂuential rankings with MSIM,
as found in Table 4, can lead the analyst to ‘those actors
that are directly impacted by or serve critical roles in adap-
tation or policy processes, but do not leverage inﬂuence in
any meaningful way’ (p. 406).
The results of ‘less inﬂuential’ rankings suggest that
many private sector actors (input providers, agro-indus-
tries, and rural banks, for example) are frequently identiﬁed
by respondents as highly relevant, yet do not appear to be
active or inﬂuential in decision-making and implemen-
tation around climate change adaptation. Respondents
reference the importance of these groups by citing the chal-
lenges in distributing new and improved seed varieties
without the support of Ghana’s network of input providers,
and a similar inability to develop new varieties without
research and academia, also included on this list of less
inﬂuential groups. Similar difﬁculties in reducing post-
harvest losses and improving market access for smallholder
farmers are cited in the absence of engagement from agro-
industries. The presence of MLGRD in this table is reﬂec-
tive of Ghana’s slow-moving advances in ﬁscal and admin-
istrative decentralization. Respondents cite obstruction on
the part of national-level actors, and limited capacity of
staff at the district level as key factors in MLGRD’s
minimal inﬂuence at present.
Table 3. Most inﬂuential actors groups with regard to agricultural climate change adaptation policy in Ghana, entire sample (n = 30).
Actor/actor group
Frequency identiﬁed as ‘highly
relevant’ by respondents
Average adjusted ranking
score (1≤Ra≤ 13)
Composite
inﬂuence score
MoFA 28 10.6 9.9
MESTI 26 10.0 8.6
EPA 23 9.9 7.6
Farmers 27 7.3 6.5
World Bank 22 8.4 6.2
DA 24 7.6 6.1
CSIR 21 8.2 5.8
GMET 19 8.5 5.4
MLNR 19 8.4 5.3
FC 18 8.1 4.9
UN Agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNEP) 18 7.6 4.6
GEF 15 8.4 4.2
NDPC 15 8.0 4.0
MoF 14 8.6 4.0
INGO’s (undifferentiated) 20 5.9 4.0
CGIAR research program on CCAFS 17 6.8 3.9
Bilateral agency #1 19 6.0 3.8
International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD)
17 6.7 3.8
Bilateral Agency #2 16 7.1 3.8
Traditional authorities (paramount chief,
sub-chief, and chiefs)
15 7.3 3.6
Table 4. Less inﬂuential actors groups with regard to agricultural climate change adaptation policy in Ghana, entire sample (n = 30).
Actor/actor group
Frequency identiﬁed as ‘highly
relevant’ by respondents
Average adjusted ranking score
(1≤Ra≤ 13)
Composite inﬂuence
score
National Disaster Management
Organization (NADMO)
11 3.3 1.2
Agro-industries 12 4.3 1.7
Banks 13 4.9 2.1
Civil society group #1 12 5.5 2.2
Universities 13 5.5 2.4
NGOs 14 5.1 2.4
Bilateral #3 11 6.6 2.4
Bilateral #4 10 7.3 2.4
Bilateral #5 12 6.3 2.5
Input providers 14 5.6 2.6
MLGRD 11 7.3 2.7
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5.3. Inﬂuence across levels
Research in adaptation policy must take into account the
multilevel features of the policy process (Adger, 2001;
Adger et al., 2005b), including policy development,
implementation, and evaluation. Each of these stages impli-
cates different actor sets, knowledge and information, and
resources. As such, MSIM results that reﬂect perceived
inﬂuence from each of these unique levels of operation
can be instructive. Table 5 provides a comparison of the
most inﬂuential actors from the perspective of each oper-
ational level. There were considerable variations in per-
ceived stakeholder inﬂuence according to respondents
operating at different levels (national, regional, and local).
Calculating a composite inﬂuence score from the per-
spective of a distinct operational level follows the same pro-
tocol as used for the entire sample. The sum of average
adjusted ranking scores for each stakeholder groups is pro-
duced from the maps pertaining to the operational level in
question and is divided by the maximum possible frequency
score of 15, 7, and 8, for national, regional, and local oper-
ational levels, respectively.
These multilevel results offer insights in to which actor
groups can serve as bridging agents between operational
levels, and highlight key gaps in the multilevel adaptation
planning and implementation process.
6. Discussion and implications
Several key trends emerge from MSIM analysis in Ghana
with regard to the underlying power structure of the adap-
tation regime. These trends provide insight in to the techni-
cal, a-political nature of the adaptation regime, the distinct
lack of pluralism among highly inﬂuential actors, and the
cross-level interaction of formal and informal institutions.
Regarding stakeholder participation, in this analysis
government and international agencies are most frequently
Figure 2. Combined MSIM map of highly inﬂuential actors for Ghana’s agricultural adaptation regime (N = 30).
Note: This results map visualizes the most inﬂuential actor groups as perceived by the combined MSIM sample of 30 respondents. Respon-
dents were asked to rank actors for their inﬂuence with regard to ‘agricultural climate change adaptation policy in Ghana’, which includes
both policy development and implementation. The most inﬂuential actor group is deemed to be the MoFA. The least inﬂuential (although
not without considerable inﬂuence) is traditional authorities. The size of the circles in this ﬁgure reﬂects the relative size of the actors
groups, albeit not proportionally. The circle colour (or gradient) represents the actor group type, as indicated in the key to the left of
the pyramid.
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ranked as highly inﬂuential in Ghana’s agricultural climate
change adaptation regime. Of the top 20 most inﬂuential
actors (Table 3) using data from the entire respondent
sample, 10 (50%) are government agencies and 7 (35%)
are internationally based. These groups are perceived as
especially inﬂuential among national-level respondents, a
sample which most closely reﬂects the views of traditional
‘policymakers’. Inﬂuence, then, in Ghana’s adaptation
policy regime is perceived as bipolar. Technical govern-
ment agencies (MESTI and MoFA), INGOs, bilateral and
multilateral donors form what can be referred to as the
‘adaptation establishment’, or the dominant group of
power holders (elites) within the adaptation regime.
While the adaptation regime can be safely considered
‘elite-centered’, it does not exhibit elitism common to tra-
ditional power structures in Ghana – and West Africa
more broadly – that elevate ‘big men’ politicians and
powerful executive branch players for their positional
power and clientalistic tendencies (Fukuyama, 2014;
Rowley, 2000). In fact, political parties, the President,
and the District Chief Executive (DCE) are not cited by
respondents in this study as highly inﬂuential in agricul-
tural climate change adaptation. These ﬁndings are consist-
ent with that of Cameron (2011) who suggests ‘there is not
a broad demand from constituents for politicians to own the
response agenda to climate change, and thus little or no
domestic accountability pressure for achievement’
(p. 20). Meanwhile, adaptation literature increasingly evi-
dences the importance of political considerations in deter-
mining adaptation policy outcomes by ensuring popular
participation, improving downward accountability, and
allocating appropriate discretionary power to local actors
through democratic processes (Dodman & Mitlin. 2013;
Granderson, 2014; Ribot, 2003).
In addition to the exclusion of politically oriented
groups (a-politicization), the private sector and civil
society are also notably absent from the power rankings,
and even appear among ‘less inﬂuential’ actors in MSIM
results. The private sector’s limited engagement in adap-
tation policy development to-date is widely documented
and has important implications (Agrawala et al., 2011;
Biagini & Miller, 2013; Pauw & Pegels, 2013). That a
large, diverse swath of actor group types – the private
sector among them – are not considered inﬂuential within
Ghana’s adaptation regime challenges calls for system-
wide approaches to adaptation in food systems to facilitate
truly transformational adaptation (Ingram, 2011; O’Brien,
2012).
With respect to multilevel institutional design, MSIM
results conﬁrm that respondents tend to attribute the
highest inﬂuence to actor groups within their own level
of operation, what we term ‘proximal level bias’. As
such, several organizations embedded in multilevel insti-
tutional structures are not included as highly inﬂuential
by respondents across operational levels. Traditional auth-
orities, for example, manifest as chiefs, sub-chiefs, and
Paramount chiefs at the local level in the Lawra District,
but are represented by the National House of Chiefs and
the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs
(MCTA) in Accra. Similarly, the DA operates semi-auton-
omously at the local level but is guided by the MLGRD at
the national level. Both of these groups, traditional leaders
and the DA, are deemed highly inﬂuential by local-level
respondents but their national-level counterparts, the
House of Chiefs, MCTA, and MLGRD, are not perceived
as inﬂuential by national-level respondents.
This dichotomy in power attributed to traditional auth-
orities is reﬂective of a popular debate in Ghana over the
role and legitimacy of traditional ruling structures
(Abotchie, Awedoba, & Odotei, 2006; Ahwoi, 2010;
Asamoah, 2012; Belden, 2010; Crawford, 2004; Guri,
2006; Lentz, 2006). At present, traditional authorities are
considered locally as custodians of the land and natural
resources, they determine land ownership, and decide
over local conﬂicts in traditional courts (Crook, Asante,
& Brobbey, 2010). Chiefs are often trusted sources of
local and traditional knowledge, and are responsible for
the framing of climate change in customary religious
terms, among other inﬂuential socio-cultural roles (Egua-
voen, 2013; Nyantakyi-Frimpong, 2013). Yet from the
Table 5. Most inﬂuential actors with regard to agricultural climate change adaptation policy in Ghana as perceived by respondents at the
national, regional, and local levels.
(a). National level (n = 15) (b). Regional level (n = 7) (c). Local level (n = 8)
MESTI MoFA CSIR
MoFA MESTI MoFA
World Bank EPA EPA
NDPC Farmers Farmers
UN agencies FC DA
EPA CSIR Traditional authorities (paramount chief, sub-chief, and chiefs)
GEF DA NGOs (undifferentiated)
Bilateral #6 District Department of Agriculture FC
MLNR GMET MESTI
GMET GEF MLNR
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central perspective, there is a sense of competition between
modern and traditional governing structures. In fact, ‘since
the era of colonization, Ghanaian governments have
struggled with how to use traditional authorities to
achieve their own objectives without making chiefs more
powerful than themselves’ (Hoffman, 2010, p. 5). This is
consistent with adaptation literature on formal and informal
rural institutions and the need for improved institutional
collaboration between these entities (Agrawal, 2010;
Berman et al., 2012; Schipper et al., 2012; Yaro, Teye, &
Bawakyillenuo, 2014). Increased collaboration between
the DA and traditional authorities, in particular, can
assuage concerns posed by some institutional theorists
that increasing the power of so-called non-representative
authorities (e.g. chiefs) can slow democratic transition in
decentralized regimes (Ribot, 1996).
Finally, farmers are deemed both ‘highly relevant’ and
highly inﬂuential from the combined perspective of the
entire MSIM sample, yet they are not ranked among the
most inﬂuential actor groups by national-level respondents.
This reﬂects a common challenge in national adaptation
planning resulting from proximal level bias; wherein the
physical distance between policymakers and those
farming communities affected by climate change impacts
limits the integration of these marginalized groups in
decision-making, contributing to the bipolar, elite-centered
structure of the regime. MSIM thus provides empirical evi-
dence of the ‘adaptation paradox’ at work – those most
affected by climate impacts may be most distanced from
adaptation intervention decisions (Ayers, 2011). This
ﬁnding highlights the important nexus between participa-
tory processes and institutional design. If ‘highly relevant’
stakeholders operate within an institutional environment
where they are merely consulted on predetermined policy
then pre-existing power relations between actor groups
may be reinforced and perpetuated. In the words of Arn-
stein, ‘participation without redistribution of power is an
empty and frustrating process for the powerless’ (1969,
p. 216).
7. Limitations
The multilevel trends in power dynamics identiﬁed in this
study reﬂect perceptions and experiences of stakeholders
in the Lawra District and the Upper West Region of
Ghana. The ﬁndings are not necessarily reﬂective of other
districts and regions in the country. Traditional ruling struc-
tures, for example, differ dramatically across the country,
some wielding more or less power than is characteristic
of chiefs in the UWR. Similarly, the perceived inﬂuence
of NGOs and INGOs is also geographically dependent.
Second, it should be noted that MSIM respondents are
most likely to perceive inﬂuence as it is derived from
highly visible sources of power. Actor groups deriving
power from positions of authority, of prestige, or that
have ready access to resources and capital are more likely
to be perceived as highly inﬂuential by respondents.
Actor groups that exercise less visible or less deliberate
forms of power, such as the media, are less likely to
appear among ‘highly inﬂuential actors’. Finally, organizing
respondent data according to operational level (national,
regional, and local) is only one such grouping available to
the MSIM analyst. Operational levels are not perfect delinea-
tions. Some of the respondents in this exercise frequently
move between Accra (national) and Wa (regional), or Wa
and Lawra (local). Deﬁning their predominant level of oper-
ation ultimately requires some subjectivity.
8. Conclusion
Rendering underlying power and inﬂuence dynamics
visible among adaptation actors is an important step in
improving the delivery of resources to those most vulner-
able and assigning responsibility for outcomes in adap-
tation regimes. MSIM is applied here to Ghana’s
agricultural adaptation policy regime with diverse respon-
dents from Accra, the Upper West Region, and the Lawra
District. The study constitutes among the ﬁrst efforts to
empirically map power and inﬂuence in adaptation
regimes. Through this analysis, MSIM provides insight in
to the underlying power structure of the regime (i.e. elite-
centred versus pluralistic orientations), and contributes to
two key power-laden themes in adaptation: stakeholder par-
ticipation and multilevel institutional design.
Respondents in this study consider power in the adap-
tation policy regime in Ghana as bipolar, or elite-centred.
A distinguishable ‘adaptation establishment’ or dominant
group of power elites made up of technical government
and international agencies can be identiﬁed. This power
orientation effectively renders adaptation planning techni-
cal and a-political, contrasting with traditional power struc-
tures in Ghana that elevate powerful executives and
political parties. In fact, contrary to the hyper-politicized
nature of climate change adaption at international levels,
agricultural adaptation policy in Ghana would beneﬁt
from increased political engagement from the President,
MPs, DCEs, and other party leaders to facilitate improved
decentralization, popular participation, and downward
accountability. This would reduce bipolarity and cross-
level disconnect in the regime and make the policy
process more adaptive to genuine needs.
Achieving increased pluralism more broadly in the adap-
tation regime (including power distribution towards the
private sector, civil society, academia, and farmers them-
selves) should also be a priority and will allow for system-
wide, transformational adaption that the current homogenous,
elite-centered power structure cannot accommodate. A more
pluralized power structure would offer increased transpar-
ency, responsiveness, and legitimacy within the regime,
widening the portfolio of potential adaptation responses.
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MSIM results also reﬂect the challenges in multilevel
institutional design of adaptation regimes. In particular,
the disparity in power attributed to the DA, traditional auth-
orities, and farmers between local and national-level actors
is especially detrimental to the cross-level performance of
the regime. Potential bridging actors with high local-level
inﬂuence could be better engaged at higher levels of oper-
ation to improve understanding of and responses to adap-
tation needs, capacities, and delivery. This – in the case
of traditional authorities – will require increased coordi-
nation between formal and informal institutions in which
‘modern’ and traditional governing structures are seen not
as competing but complimentary institutions. Increased
emphasis on developing informal farmer-based organiz-
ations and national farmer associations will also help to
assuage the effects of the ‘adaptation paradox’ and
improve farmer representation across levels.
While the results of this analysis are reﬂective of only
one region in Ghana and do not trace the full scope of
power networks or their dynamics, this study marks an
important advancement in understanding which actor
groups are considered inﬂuential within a given adaptation
regime. The results highlight existing patterns of inﬂuence
and bias in adaptation policy-making, evidencing the con-
centration of power among technical agencies and the need
for adaptive, agile, multilevel institutional networks.
Achieving true ‘polycentric’, responsive multilevel govern-
ance cannot evolve through simple decentralization or scale
linkage, but must build on a thorough understanding of
power and inﬂuence dynamics among key players in the
adaptation policy process, as identiﬁed here. Further
research in to the underlying sources of these power
dynamics can provide a basis for generating more inclus-
ive, pluralistic adaptation policy regimes.
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